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A skillful program committee chooses titles for conference papers that 
deceive in their simplicity, which on close inspection turn out not to be 
simple at all, and which raise more questions than an author can hope to answer 
in the 5000 words that they allot to it. They thus lay the groundwork for future 
research and for .future conferences. Certainly the title of this paper is de­
ceptively simple, yet cloaks a problem that goes to the heart of political theory: 
how should human beings organi?.P thPir cnlle~tive endeavors, especially those 
t.hnt- 1'.'cqt.ti_rc gove1:nment-al action, so. as to best achieve their d:l.verse and often 
conflicting objectives? 
The recent historical or.i.gins of the question posed in the title are clear 
enough. There has been a running debate since the Second World War (with ante­
cedents in the 1930s) over whether the world economy would be better se1:vE>rl by 
full multilateralism or by regional groupings that "discriminate" in favor of 
members and against non-members. This question arose especially with respect to 
customs unions and free trade areas, where the principal instrument of discrim­
ination was the import tariff. But it also arose with respect to balance-of­
payments policy (with the Sterling Area and the European Payments Union rep­
resenting the leading examples of regional groupings) and, more recently and 
more hypothetically. with respect to the range of common currencies--what is 
the optimal area for a single currency? As usually posed, these questions con­
cern groupings among nations. But similar questions, deriving from a different 
starting point, have be.en asked with increasing force about the optimal provision 
of public goods and services within nations, particularly those with a federal 
structure, which have shown increasing strain in recent years in trying to pro­
vide public goods both efficiently and with sufficient regard for local variations 
in public desires. 
Thus from a theoretical point of view the issue posed in the title goes 
beyond possible regional relationships among nations. Put more generally, we 
can ask what is the optimal c0mbination of communities, or regionst for an inte­
grated area? In some cases t!-ie answer may involve regional groupings of existing 
nations; in others it might involve several regions within existing nations. 
But before proceeding further we should make a few distinctions about the 
meaning of "integrated area." 
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Some Important Distinctions Concerning "Integration" 
Although a detailed discussion of alternative forms of integration will 
be covered elsewhere, several distinctions are necessary here before proceeding 
to a discussion of optimal-integrated areas. First "integration" can refer 
to the legal and institutional relationships within a region in which economic 
transactions take place. Or it can refer to the market relationships among 
goods and factors within the region. This distinction becomes clear when we 
imagine a nineteenth century laissez faire economy with no government barriers 
to inter-regional transactions, but with markets not linked because of ignorance 
or high transportation costs. The regions would be integrated in the first sense. 
but not in the second. This would be true even in the presence of a high degree 
of inter-governmental coordination between the countries comprising the region. 
If there are institntional or legal barriers to trade and capital movements. 
on the other hand, markets of course cannot be fully integrated either, at 
least in the sense of equal product and factor prices. But these prices may 
move in parallel with one another. indicating market integration at the margin, 
i.e. high sensitivity to developments elsewhere in the region. 
Before we return to this distinction between institutional and market 
integration, it is useful to draw a second distinction, between integration 
as state of affairs and integration as process. M'uch of the postwar debate 
on regionalism vs globalism was concerned with process rather than with state· 
of affairs~ the advocates of economic regionalism saw it as an effective route 
to attain some other objective, either economic globalism or regional political 
unification. The universalism of the Bretton Woods Agreement and of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, both laid down in the 1940s, stood in sharp 
contrast to the regionalism of the Sterling Area. the European Payments Union, 
the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Economic Community. 
Each of the latter institutions was hotly resisted in their early s,tages, as 
an undesirable retreat from the universalism which the architects o,f the postwar 
international economic system hoped to achieve. The regional institutions, for 
their part, were rarely justified as ends in themselves, although occasionally 
that strand of thought was present. Rather, they were regarded as superior means 
to achieve more far-reaching ends. Thus Robert Triffin argued persistently that 
the European Payments Union, with its implied discriminatioh against the U.S. 
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dollar, represented much the ~oGt effective way to achieve cur.re.ncy ccnvcL·~i­
bility and to restore a truly multilateral system of interna~ior.~l payments •.!/ 
move more ~-.ii 1r:'..y togetherLike-minded countries with similar problems would 
thnn they could either separately or when grouped with countries :2cing very 
different problems. To try everything at once would stymie progress, as the 
failure of the International T~a:ie Organization seemed to sugges~. On this 
fo~mulation, the objective of beth part~es to thgn£~bate is the same, namely 
to achieve it.a nultilateral world economy; but judgments differ/on the best way 
Unfortunately for clarity in the debate, another group, associaterl with 
the name Jean Monnet, had quite different objectives, and sought to use th·:! 
same L:~'.'truments of economic regionalism to attain their objective of region~l 
political unification. So a confusion was introduced:_ the probability that 
economic regionalism would eventually lead to economic universalism t-ms reduced 
to the ext .:mt that it would lead to regional political integration. 
Inter:;r::-.t:.on as a process involves establishing a situation that is not in 
long-run equilibrium: partial integration creates new problems which in turn 
call for further integrative measures, and so on.'l:. / One thing leads to another, 
and eventually political integration captures the minds of the people. On the 
first version of integration as process, success among a limited group of countries 
breeds a willingness by others to join in, and eventually the regional approach 
becomes global. On the second version, it creates durable political bonds within 
the region. In either of these frames of reference, the "optimal" region for 
integration is that which best achieves the desired objective rapidly and 
securely. 
We return to integration ~s a state of affairs. Markets are integrated if 
one price prevails for each product or factor, after allowance for transportation 
costs. On this market formulation, the optimum integrated area is the wo:ld as 
a whole, for any artificial interference with price equilibration (except those 
designed to eliminate market imperfections) will ipso facto represent a source 
of inefUciency in the allocation of resources. What then is the case for 
regionalism? It lies, I believe, not in the realm of private goods, but in the 
realm of public or collective goods, where these are defined broadly to include 
the nature of the economic regime itself, i.e. the system of property owners~ip, 
of contrac L, t} ~ risk-bearing, and the like. s~me i nciividu;:.ls may not want an 
economic regime based on markets, and are willing to pay the economic price for 
-4-
that decision. Vie"Wed froo the perspective of public goods, "n:-gions" really 
mean governmental jurisdictions, and the enquiry must begin with the functi0ns 
of government. The standard list calls on governments to prcvi~~ public goods, 
to stabilize the level and growth of income, to redistribute income, and above 
all to prov:f.de a regulatory framework for economic and social transa.ctions. 
Whether a region is "optimal" t 1ten depends on its optimal suitability for 
performing these various functions. "Optimality" means: best able to serve 
the various social objectives, where "best"' is in the Pareto sense of not 
permi.tting closer achievement of one objective without compromising the att~in­
ment of some other objective. 
The perspective adopted here thus renders irrelevant the classic distinr~fon 
by Viner between trade-creating and trade-diverting customs unions, and their 
analogues in the monetary arena. As Cooper and Hassell showed a decade ago, 
in terms o: "t:raight national income a unilateral tariff reduction dominates the 
formation of a discriminatory trading bloc; the formation of customs unions 
must therefore be r2.tionalized along different lines}../ Harry Johnson has provide<'.. 
a more general framework for regarding protection in general and customs unions 
in particular as devices (perhaps inefficient ones) for the attainment of 
public goods, i.e. features from which the public at large derivefl some s~tisfac­
tion, whether- they be nationalism, redistribution of incorae, or a level of 
industrial production above what could be sustained by the ope~ation of unimpeded 
rr.arket forces,!!_/ In this context the formation of regional groupings on a dis­
criminatory basis might represent the most efficient method for attaining a 
given objective; but the res·:i:s woul<l have to be shown in each specific case, 
for the general optimality of discriminatory trade or payments arrangements 
cannot be assumed. 
The Optimal Provision of Collective Goods 
The optimal provision of public goods involves both technologi~al consider­
ations aad the accommodation of public preferences. We will first consider 
the techaological side, which considerations generally (but not always) press 
for enlargeraent of governmental jurisdiction, while accommodation of public 
preferences generally (but not always) presses for relatively small govern­
mental jur~~d!ctions. 
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Three technical factors have a bearing on the provision of public coods: 
economies of scale, the presence of externalities (including the important 
special case in which some of the objects of regulation are mobile), and the 
possibilities for reducing economic disturbances through integrating markets. 
We will take up each of these considerations in turn, the last especially in 
the context of economic stabilization. 
E~~no~i~s of Scale Scale economies offer a traditional argument for 
increasing the size of jurisdictions, at least up to a point. Certain public 
goods, especially those requiring for efficiency a high degree of specialization, 
experience strong economies of scale. Examples would be certain forms of 
scientific research, public health, police investigatory work, the penal system, 
some aspects of national defense, and flood control and irrigation. Where 
scale econ01nies are substantial, the governmental jurisdiction (or its 
functional equivalent in facilities shared among jurisdictions) must be large 
enough to encompass the scale required, or else its residents will either 
enjoy lower quality services or pay more than is technically necessary for 
tho.se services. 
The optimum scale for governmental jurisdiction will of course ·17ary from 
public good to public good. Where jurisdictions can be effectively separated 
alnng functional lines, they can be tailored to the requirements of each 
different good. (Los Angeles and London both offer examples of urban areas with 
many overlapping jurisdictionsj drawn in part along functional lines.) Where 
as a practical matter that is not possible, the choice of scale of a jurisdiction 
should (other things being equal) be governed by the minimum cost of the 
package of public goods that is to be offered. Because of organizational, 
managerial, and informational costs, the optimal jurisdiction will be well below 
the global level. 
External Effects External effects arise when activities within one 
jurisdiction affect directly the welfare of residents of another jurisdiction, 
other than through market prices. External effects can be either positive, 
as in the case of malarial control, or negative, as in the case of downstream 
water pollution. In one respect, external effects can be thought of as a more 
general case of economies (or diseconomies) of scale: once a service (e.g. mal­
arial control) is provided, the marginal cost of additional consumption (enjoy­
ment) of that service is low or zero, and therefore the average cost to citizens 
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is lower, the larger the jurisdiction in terms of ta~~ble population. It. is 
worth while to preserve the distinction between the two considerations, hm-,cver. 
since economies of scale normally refer to technical input-out relationships 
in the production of a well-defined good or service, not to the consumption 
effects. 
A special kind of externality arises from the mobility of the objects 
of policy action. Here the problem is that. the "public good" by community 
preference may involve unwelcome restraints on certain elements of the com­
munity, e.g. its business firms or its radio stations or its high income 
members. Activution of these regulatory or redistributional policies will 
then drive the adversely affected parties out of a jurisdiction that is too 
small relat.ive to their domain of mobility. They will escape the onerous action 
by leaving the jurisdiction in question.I/ To prevent this, the jurisdiction 
must either inhibit the mobility of its residents or become la~ge enough to 
encompass their entire domain of mobility. The latter course does not necessarily 
involve enlargement to the global level because as a practical matter persons 
and firms are not globally mobile. Considerations of economics, geography~ 
language, and culture all limit the actual domain of mobility. 
The mobility of factors beyond a government jurisdiction limits the 
capacity of that jurisdiction to redistribute income. The heavily taxed will 
move out, and those who are subsidized will move in, both of which movements 
undercut the fiscal viability of redistributional policies. It is true that 
even trade in goods and services will affect the rewards to factors of production, 
as underlined in strong form by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem concerning 
factor-price-equalization. But.the imposit';,n of ~ariffs can alter the free­
trade distrib:.ition of income, and in any case the resulting factor rewards are 
before allowance for income taxes, which can serve redistributive objectives. 
It is factor mobility, not connnodity movement, that really limits the possibilities 
for redistribution. 
Similar considerations apply to attempts by jurisdictions to regulate 
business activity, e.g. capital structure, financial disclosure, safety, 
pollution, and so on. Once the regulations go beyond what is acceptable to 
the mobile firm, where "acceptability" will be influenced by the competitive 





Economic Stabilization. A third consideration for the optimal siz~ 
of an integrated region concerns the objective of economic stabilization 
on the assumption that policy measures to stabilize the level of income 
or employment are uncertain in effect or costly to use. Under these cir­
cumstances, any arrangement that reduces the macro-economic disturbances 
to the region in question will be beneficial. For a given region, macro­
economic disturbances (that is, disturbances that in the absence of 
countervailing action would alter perceptibly the level of aggregate 
income or employment) can arise either within the region or from outside 
it. Its economy will respond to these disturbances in some well-defined 
way, which depends among other things on the openness of the region, and 
it can take steps to compensate for the disturbance with various regional 
instruments of policy, whose impact also depends on the structure of the 
regional economy. 
How then should the boundaries of a region be drawn from the view­
point of maximizing the stability of the regional economy? By boundaries 
we_ mean here the limits of application of tariffs or direct controls on 
inter-regional transactions and/or a single currency or fixed exchange 
rates between currencies within the region. 
First consider the disturbances that create economic instability. 
If internal disturbances are low compared with those emanating from out-
side the region, the region should perhaps insulate itself from other regions, 
using the devices indicated above. This is analogous to risk-splitting in 
the writing of insurance: a low risk group can gain by separating itself 
from the rest. In contrast, if internal disturbances are large relative 
to those emanating from outside the region, the region may gain by amalga­
mating with other regions and thus in effect export some of its distur­
bances to the larger area. Finally, if the relative importance of distur­
bances originating inside the region is about the same as those originating 
outside, but the disturbances have different patterns, i.e. are less than 
perfectly correlated, then the interests of each of two regions will gen­
erally be well served by joining, since the disturbances will partially 
offset one another and produce a lower net disturbance in both regions; 
that is, the regions will engage in risk-spreading rather than in risk­
splitting by joining one another in a common region, analogous to enlarging 
7/an insurance pool.-
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If we now take the net dis-::urban~e as given, re<luced as l.L n,.uy hov<' 
been through export or through import of partially offsetting distur-· 
bances, we can ask how much damage it will do to the region of our inter­
est, and how the region may take policy action to mitigate the remaining 
damage. Mundell has pointed out that if factor mobility is high within a 
region, adjustment to some disturbances can take place quite smoothly, as 
shifts in demand among goods lead to prompt re-employment of any redundant 
factors. Kenen has made a related point in emphasizing the importance of 
diversity in an economy, both to reduce the net disturbance through mutually 
offsetting of uncorrelated disturbances, and to spread the impact widely 
8/throughout an economy,thereby reducing the social cost.- In Mundell's 
formulation, stabilization requirements alone imply as small an area as 
possible (each with its own floating currency), for that leads as close as 
possible to a regime of complete price flexibility, and.the market will 
always clear. Efficiency in the use of money leads Mundell's optimum cur­
rency area to stop far short of this atomism. Kenen's emphasis on distur­
bances suggests that even in the realm of stabilization alone the optimum 
area may be far larger than Mundell's argument implies.2/ 
Moreover, extremely open (small) economies may find themselves bereft 
of useful instruments of policy to deal with disturbances. McKinnon has 
suggested that money illusion in an open economy may diminish to the point 
at which fluctuations in the exchange rate of the region's currency may 
cease to be effective in influencing patterns of demand, and indeed may 
simply induce residents to hold •=foreign" currencies. IO/ Also, a region 
may be so open that standard macro-economic fiscal action ceases to be an 
effective instrument of demand management, because the great leakages 
abroad vitiate its domestic impact. 111 This vitiation of policy is a more 
complicated question than at first meets the eye, because of course the 
disturbances are also strongly attenuated in these very open economiE~s, 
and we must therefore ask whether on balance the region is worse off in 
terms of macro-economic management than it would be with more effective 
12/instruments of policy but also with larger net disturbances.-
But the reduced effectiveness of policy instruments limits the region's 
capacity to compensate for disturbances arising outside the region, at least 
so long as some social cost is associated with their exercise at more 
intensive levels. 131 
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Most of the considerations discussed above--economies of scale, 
external effects, escape from regulation and redistribution, effective 
economic stabilization--argue for increasing the size of jurisdictions. 
The entire globe would be the logical limit to this process. Only in­
creasing difficulties of management (diseconomies of scale associated 
with management and bureaucracy) and, for those regions which can profit 
by it, risk-splitting,cut in the other direction, toward smaller seal~ 
of the optimal jurisdiction. But we have not yet made allowance for 
the diversity of preferences for collective goods. 
Diversity of preferences. Individuals differ greatly in their pre­
ferences for collective goods, both of the systemic type (i.e. the fun­
damental nature of the regime, capitalist or socialist, strong pre­
ference for order vs. high respect for individualism, etc.) and for 
specific public goods (e.g. provision for flood control or parks or 
scientific research). These strong differences are conditioned by dif­
ferences in cultural background and in income level. The greater the 
diversity of preferences within a given jurisdiction, the more difficult 
it will be, obviously, to satisfy all the demands for public goods by 
the residents even approximately, since by their nature public goods 
are provided in roughly equal amount to all residents of the relevant 
area. There are thus large consumption losses in jurisdictions with a 
wide diversity of tastes, relative to what would be possible with different 
juiisdictions each catering more precisely to the preferences of its resi­
dents. This consideration thus pushes strongly toward relatively small 
communities that are homogeneous in their preferences for collective goods; 
it underlies much of the pressure for greater decentralization of govern­
ment and more local control. 
In a recent b'(ok on Size and Democracy, two political scientists 
pose the trade-off in a slightly different way. They point to the con­
flict between "system capacity" and "citizen effectiveness, 11 that is,. 
the capacity of the governmental system to deliver the (public) goods 
efficiently, as against the ability of its citizens to participate ef­
fectively in making governmental decisions affecting the level and com­
position of public goods to be provided. They do at one point seem to 
1. 
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s11ggP.st a positive value to diversity among the citizenship and to 
pluralism as ,such, however, particularly to provide an environment 
favorable to the dissenting citizen (which on one issue or another will 
be all of them) and this would suggest enlarging the jurisdiction de­
spite the advantages cited above for having communities with homogeniety 
of tastes. They do not, however, attempt to weigh this desire for 
pluralism against the necessary consumption loss on other public goods 
that arises from diversity in tastes. 141 
Considerations of liberty, however, press for smaller, more numer­
ous jurisdictions. Breton has put the point strongly: "the number of 
levels and sizes of units [of government] should be such that for any 
level of costs, the power of politicians--defined as their capacity to 
depart from the preferences of citizens--should be minimized. 11151 
Those fearful of the coercive powers of the state would set the scale of 
jurisdictions at a low level, even if that meant sacrificing some eco­
nomic efficiency, for t~e sake of keeping politicans under check through 
competition with other jurisdictions. 
Conclusion: What is the Outimal Area: 
How are these conflicting considerations to be weighed against one 
another? That itself is an issue involving the. diversity of preferences, 
for different individuals will be willing to sacrifice differing amounts 
of income (as taxes) in the form of less efficient provision of conven­
tional public goods in order to purchase some given amount of liberty or 
national prestige or sense of cultural identity. It is necessary, as 
Samuelson told us all along, to have a social welfare function that 
weights not only the provision of goods and services but also the individ­
uals that make up the community. But to say we need a social welfare 
function, while formally correct, merely passes the question to the agent 
who specifies that function, 
Functional federalism. Compromise among the various considerations 
is possible. Under a system of functional federalism~ the trade-off be­
tween scale economies and diversity of tastes is made for each public 
good separately, leading to many overlapping governmental jurisdictions, 
each dealing with its own set of highly specialized and closely related 
problems: police protection, weather forecasting and control,flood control. 
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Each has its own autonomous decision-making structure and its own citizenry, 
which may differ from issue to issue. This in a way is the method of 
specialized international organizations, each established by separate
. 16/treaties, and it can also be seen in federal countries.- It is an 
attractive idea, and in practice it will be necessary, at least in some 
degree. The notion of sovereignty inevitably becomes ambiguous under a 
system of functional federalism, for there is no Sovereign, only a series 
of partial sovereignties. But that ambiguity is necessary to achieve the 
objective of the optimal provision of public goods, unless of course the 
existence of an unambiguous sovereignty is itself regarded as the over-riding 
public good. 
However, a system of functional federalism with partial sovereignties 
has its disadvantages as well. In the first place, both technology and 
tastes are in flux. A pattern of organization that is optimal now will in 
general not be optimal ten years from now. Yet an on-going bureaucracy 
develops vested interests of its own and is very difficult to change. Every 
country is living with outdated but durable--not to say tenacious-­
governmental institutions. Flexibility would be lost through a prolifer­
ation of jurisdictions, none with over-riding authority. 
In the second place, a system of functional federalism would inhibit 
bargaining and political compromise across functional jurisdictional 
boundaries in the absence of a higher authority willing and able to sac­
rifice the ~·ested interests in particular jurisdictions. For much c,f the 
time it is useful to have each issue operate on its own track, with its 
own set of conventions and sanctions to influence behavior. But from time 
to time the inability to bargain across issue areas would prevent communities 
from reaching an optimal configuration of public goods. 
Contemporary Relevance. I will close with some comments oa the con­
temporary relevance of what are otherwise broad and largely inconclusive 
generalizations. 
The pressures for enlargement of governmental jurisdictions are 
strong and growing in the modern world. Activities in each jurisdiction 
have impacts on other jurisdictions in an increasing number of areas. 
Economies of scale and externalities in some activities have been growing 
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as well, so to the extent those activities are desired as public goods, 
the jurisdiction required to carry them with any efficiency has also 
increased in size. Not the least of the sources of "spillouts" in the 
modern world is the fact that governments have beco~e active in pursuit 
of a variety of social objectives, and these pursuits often vary from 
country to country, setting up strains, including those arising from the 
mobility of firms and persons, between different jurisdictions. Even 
when factor mobility is not present, one hears charges of "unfair" com­
petition from a country that pursues practices somewhat different from 
one's own. Economic stabilization and income redistribution have become 
more difficult for countries to achieve acting alone. On all these grounds, 
therefore, an argument can be made for increasing the size of jurisdictions-­
for forming regional groupings out of nations. 
The European Economic Community is one response to these pressures. 
The motivations behind the formation of the Community are many, and are 
mainly political; but at their root was a perception that European nations 
acting one by one would have a diminishing influence on the course of world 
events, and hence even on their own welfare, so they joined together to 
pool their influence and to try to restore some autonomy to their e,,olution. 
The Community is relatively homogeneous by global standards, so the 
welfare loss associated with "harmonizing" various policies will be less 
than it would be for a larger and more diverse group of countries. Other 
successful attempts at economic integration--the Central American Common 
Market, and on a more limited basis the Andean group of countries--also re­
flect a high degree of homogeneity relative to the world at large--although 
we should keep in mind that homogeneity always looks greater from a distance 
than it really is. The United States has been relatively successful in part 
because, while very large, it is relatively homogeneous in taste and outlook, 
and it has a system of decentralized government capable of catering to 
variations in local preferences. Indeed, the greatest internal difficulties 
within the United States have arisen when local preferences, e.g. on 
racial discrimination, offend a national norm. 
Growing centralization and bureaucraticization in response to pressures 
for enlargement have created counter-pressures for greater decentralization 
in governmental decision-making. These arise partly out of psychological 
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revulsion at the growing distance between the average citizen and his 
government, partly out of the perception that centralization really 
reduces responsiveness to local preferences. 
The communist countries are committed to such a fundamentally dif­
ferent conception of the basic economic regime that it is difficult to 
contemplate meaningful integration between those countries and other 
countries except along highly specialized and functional lines. Many less 
developed countries are still groping for the appropriate underlying 
regime for themselves, trying to adapt a colonial legacy to new needs and 
to indigenous preferences, and until this process is completed it will 
be difficult to integrate such countries with others whose basic regime 
is settled and is generally regarded as satisfactory. Once again, :lnte­
gration along specialized functional lines is about all one should reason­
ably try at this stage, and even there such attempts as have been made are 
often plagued by difficulties because some countries question the funda­
mental propositions that others take for granted. 
For these various reasons, therefore, regional integration regarding 
public goods seems to be a more promising route than does global integration. 
Indeed, there should be no objection to groups of countries getting to­
gether to pursue their common interests, so long as neither their intent 
nor their effect is gain at the expense of other countries. There are 
numerous opportunities for such "clubs" to form which are not at the expense 
of other countries, and indeed their activities may be beneficial tn others. 
I conclude therefore in the same way Alec Cairncross did in his recent 
discussion of the optimal firm: there is no such thing. 171 Nor is there 
such a thing as an optimal region, at least at the high level of generality 
that has been considered here. Not the least of the difficulties is that 
close cooperation among nations or within regions builds close ties and 
more homogeneous preferences as well as reflecting them, a point well per­
ceived by the advocates of the economic route to political unification 
of Europe. Rather, optimality calls for a much more complex array of 
jurisdictions, compromising between the desire for greater decentralization 
and the technical need for greater centralization in decision-making. 
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